Category Archives: RESPONSE

Review of Recently Released CERT Liability Guide

23 Monday Jul 2012

Posted by in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

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Recently, several local agencies partnered with the national CERT program to release the CERT Liability Guide: A Risk Management Overview for Local CERT Programs. I’ve been a volunteer with the Montgomery County, MD Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) since March of this year and recently completed the CERT instructor course. I think the CERT program is one of the most proactive training and outreach programs available to local government and I firmly believe in the potential for CERT to expand and mature in the future.

As a relatively new program though, CERT is still developing infrastructure, foundational doctrine, and other best practices. The recently released CERT Liability Guide was sorely needed. I summarized the key points below:

“CERT program activities can create risk and adverse consequences; however, perceptions about liability may be a larger barrier for CERT formation, activities and partnerships than is justified by reality. There is no indication that CERT programs have any unusual liability experience.” (Page 1)

  • In other words, currently there’s no evidence that CERT programs are more prone to lawsuits or liability than other similar volunteer programs within local government.

“Unfortunately, there is no simple, complete, and uniform remedy to address liability. Various state laws provide some relief, but many laws have detailed requirements and exclusions. Liability protections differ significantly from state to state… Even the Federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA) provides only limited protection, which leaves much control in the hands of the states. Thus, for the present, liability protection for most CERT members is likely to remain primarily at the state level.“ (Page 2)

  • It’s probably best if the emergency management agency for each state were to conduct a review (usually with the Attorney General) of the liability implications for CERT programs and issue guidance using the specific laws, requirements, and exclusions specific to the respective state.

Benefits of Risk Management (Pages 3-4) include “confidence in the program, positive public image, reduced expenses, reduced insurance costs, preservation of the CERT program’s investment in members, increased participation in CERT”.

  • There is little doubt that having a formal risk management process is helpful to an agency–if continued conscientiously. Many times volunteer agencies can suffer lulls in operational tempo, thus it is important to ensure certain activities/processes are given high priority. I would assert that a risk management program ought to be considered a high priority within volunteer organizations active in disaster, such as CERT.

The liability guide provides “Five Steps for Managing Risk” (page 4-32)

  • Step #1: Get Leadership Support
  • Step #2: Gather Information
  • Step #3: Identify and Analyze Risk
  • Step #4: Adopt Strategies to Manage Risk
  • Step #5: Maintain the Momentum

I’ll review each step below

Step #1: Get Leadership Support

  • “Leaders who oppose the use of non-professionals–especially in operational activities — may see liability as an argument against starting or maintaining a CERT program. Not everyone understands the role and importance of CERT, therefore, it helps to begin with leaders who already support the CERT program and appreciate its value to the community.” (page 5)

Step #2: Gather Information 

  • “Gather documentation about current and past volunteers and review past claims, losses, or “near-miss” events that can help identify the CERT program’s liability exposures.” (Page 7)
  • “A CERT program that has members under the age of 18 may have to comply with child labor law and must train its personnel about special issues related to interaction with minors, adapt its procedures to protect minors, and document parental consent for their participation in the program.” (Page 7)
  • “CERT Basic Training provides forms that are designed to document operational activities and communicate necessary information. Individual CERT programs may adopt other forms as well. Consistent use of adopted forms is important, so gather a complete set.” (Page 7)
  • Are the members of a CERT program sponsored by a fire department identified as “members” in the fire department’s by-laws? Identification as members of a fire department may entitle volunteers to different protection under the law or the department’s insurance in some circumstances.” (Page 7)
  • Does CERT have a safety officer?
  • Are written training records kept for all volunteers?
  • “Does the CERT program deploy teams to other states to assist in disaster response? If yes, find out whether the program works with state emergency management officials to ensure that CERT members are designated as part of the state’s response force under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).” (Page 7)

Step #3: Identify and Analyze Risk

  • Civil Liability: Different types of civil liability: negligent acts or omissions, intentional acts, strict liability, liability for the acts of others
  • Non-Operational Risk: Consider the non-operational community service opportunities that are not described in CERT Basic Training, because they also have risks, for example, lifting heavy — or not so heavy — boxes of brochures, driving motor vehicles, helping to manage crowds or traffic, distributing materials from house to house…
  • Standard Operating Procedures: Standard operating procedures and rules of conduct minimize liability by instructing CERT leaders and members how to carry out their responsibilities
  • Absence of Procedures…the absence of procedures for and documentation of activation, assignment, and deactivation is also a risk.

Step #4: Adopt Strategies to Manage Risk

  • Job Descriptions: Position or job descriptions are important risk management tools for most organizations. They help the organization identify risk and ensure the best fit between applicants and jobs.
  • Managers Assume Broader Liability: Some CERT members may assume managerial responsibilities. These include the CERT leader and any section chiefs designated by that leader during an operational response. Their responsibilities require additional management, communication, documentation, and organizational skills, and their decisions may affect the safety of more people. Consequently, their liability exposures are broader than those of team members who are assigned to individual tasks.
  • Standard Application Process: Using a standard application form helps the program collect consistent information about each [CERT] applicant…Avoid including questions that could lead to actions that would be discriminatory in an employment setting (for example, questions about age, race, religion, national origin, pregnancy, disability, health problems, and prior workers’ compensation claims)
  • Written Permission for Minors to Join CERT: Programs that accept participants under the age of 18 should also require the youth to provide a parent’s or guardian’s written permission to participate.
  • Waiver of Liability: Require any participant and, if the participant is a youth, his or her parents or guardians, to sign a written waiver of liability that describes the risks of the CERT program’s activities. Waivers of liability are often not enforceable under a state’s laws, especially against minors, however, a waiver that describes the activities and associated risks shows that the volunteer (and his or her parents) knew of the risks and chose to participate.
  • Screening: To avoid claims of wrongful discrimination, screen all applicants in the same manner. Identify in advance how the program will address specific findings and equally enforce those consequences with all applicants. To avoid liability for failure to identify an applicant who poses a risk, be certain to meet state requirements for screening individuals who will work with vulnerable populations. Keep complete records of all screening results for both accepted and declined applicants, and be certain those results are addressed consistently with each applicant.
  • Written Offer Letter: The program can avoid possible misunderstandings by putting information into a written offer letter or service agreement to be signed by the member and the member’s parents, for minors.
  • Uniform: Require that CERT members wear ―uniforms‖ and carry program identification while they are participating in CERT activities.
  • Reporting Injuries/Accidents/Illness: Require CERT members to report any injuries or illnesses they believe to be related to their CERT activities
  • Statements to Media: Require that CERT members refer media representatives to a designated public relations contact.
  • Confidentiality and Privacy:Prohibit disclosure of confidential or private information about the program, its members, the sponsoring agency and its employees, members of the public, and others.
  • Wrongful Discrimination: Prohibit discrimination, including but not limited to discrimination based on race, gender, religion, color, national origin, age, marital status, disability, and sexual orientation.
  • Harassment (Sexual and Other): Prohibit all harassment as well as the display of sexually suggestive or other offensive materials.
  • Alcohol and Drug Use: Prohibit the use of alcohol, drugs, or substances that can impair physical or mental functioning while participating in CERT activities.
  • Smoking: Prohibit smoking while participating in CERT activities.
  • Carrying Weapons: Prohibit members from bringing weapons to CERT activities unless they are sworn law enforcement officers and carrying the weapon is part of their job.
  • Reporting Changes in Driving Record, Criminal Background, or Professional Licensure Status: Require members to report any change in their driving record, criminal record, professional licensure, or other record required for the position they  hold.
  • Supervision: Every CERT program should assign a supervisor for its members.
  • Discipline and Termination: A procedure for progressive discipline and termination will help the CERT program manage these situations consistently and successfully. The program should develop the procedure with the advice of an employment attorney or skilled human resources professional.
  • Self-Activation May Not Reduce Liability: Self-activation may be pursuant to a standing order, and not all that different – for liability purposes – from an order to activate issued at the time of an emergency… By accepting members and instructing them to self-activate, some might argue that the CERT program has implicitly made a decision that the members are capable of responding without supervision
  • Workers’ Compensation: Occasionally workers’ compensation protection will be available because the state’s workers’ compensation statute specifically includes emergency volunteers in its definition of ―employee.‖ Benefits for emergency volunteers may be subject to limitations or contingencies that do not apply to regular employees.
  • Volunteer Protection Laws: The federal and many state governments have adopted volunteer protection laws that provide certain volunteers with limited immunity. The protection offered by state laws can differ, so this discussion is based on the federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA).
  • Good Samaritan Laws: ―Good Samaritan law‖ is the popular name for statutes that provide limited immunity to individuals who, in good faith, without a duty, and without compensation, help a person who is experiencing a health emergency in a setting where there is no ready access to professional care. Protection is not limited to declared emergencies, so Good Samaritan laws can protect people who happen to be present at the scene of an emergency as well as CERT members or teams who self-activate, if they meet the other requirements of the statute
  • Interstate Mutual Aid & EMAC: Some CERT programs operate teams that are capable of responding to disasters across state lines. Activities outside the home state often raise concerns about the adequacy of liability protection in the state where the aid is being provided. These concerns can be warranted, because protection varies from state to state, and CERT members are protected outside their home state only to the extent that the other state has adopted protection for emergency management volunteers. Many states’ emergency management laws protect emergency workers from other states who are responding to an official request for assistance. It pays to be familiar with the liability protection provided by the states to which the CERT(s) responds, but this can be difficult due to variation in state laws and the speed with which response takes place in the aftermath of a disaster. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a partial remedy to this challenge, but its effect is limited. Under EMAC, a responding state and its officers and employees are protected from liability.
  • Liability Insurance: Liability insurance that covers emergency management volunteers is less likely to have some of the exclusions and limitations that leave gaps in the protection offered by immunity statutes, and, unlike immunity laws, liability insurance also provides funds to pay defense costs, settlements, and judgments.

Step #5: Maintain the Momentum

  • Working through the five steps every few years –especially with new participants – gives the program a fresh perspective on vulnerabilities and new ideas about strategies. Secondly, the five steps suggest how the organization can incorporate managing liability into its ongoing operations, ensuring that everyone from the chief to the newest volunteer thinks about liability when working.

The guide was an excellent resource for non-lawyers because it did a great job of explaining legal concepts in a way that laypersons can understand. For example, when explaining the differences between immunity and indemnity, the guide takes only a few sentences to clearly detail both concepts in an easy-to-understand way: “immunity and indemnity are complementary. Immunity limits an injured person’s legal right to recover damages from the volunteer, but does not pay any costs to defend the volunteer. Indemnity does not limit the injured person’s rights to recover, but it provides the volunteer with a legal defense and pays judgments and settlements, if necessary…”

I would definitely recommend that CERT Program Managers read this guide in full–but not stop there. Then CERT PMs ought to take this guidance to their agency’s HR department and counsel to determine how to implement a robust risk management program for their volunteers. Most importantly, the conversation can’t stop there. There must be a risk management cycle that continues so that conversations about risks are common and routine. Just because CERT is volunteer-driven doesn’t mean we can ignore the risks, the liability, or legal implications of our actions.

Relocation After Evacuation: The Danger of Outdoor Evacuation

11 Saturday Feb 2012

Posted by in CAMPUS SAFETY, SECURITY, & PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE

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I frequently teach emergency management classes/trainings and the topic of evacuations comes up a lot. Even when I teach emergency managers, I’m often surprised by how few understand the concept. The objective of evacuation is to relocate to a place of greater-known safety (ideally to a location that permits continued sheltering-in-place).

Most folks think of evacuation as just getting out of dodge. Essentially, we have quite an elementary mindset of evacuation. Literally elementary. The standard we seem to have adopted is that we all simply file through the exits and make our way outside. Seemingly, that’s when most emergency management plans end. Fortunately, that is not when our duty as emergency managers ends.

Just like the captain of a ship, the duties of an emergency manager don’t end once we leave the building. Our duty extends until the folks we serve are safe (and that is not synonymous with outdoors!)

Of course, we recognize that sending folks outside isn’t always the safest course of action (if that were the case, we would just always evacuate). For instance, if we suspected that there were anthrax in the air outside, we wouldn’t evacuate outdoors. Similarly, if there were evidence of HAZMAT outdoors, we would shelter-in-place rather than evacuate.

 

Too frequently we neglect to consider the effects of outdoor evacuation posed by inclement weather, potential for secondary attack/sniper, damages/injuries caused by secondary improvised explosive devices (IED) intended for responders/evacuees, and lack of accommodations for those with functional/access needs as well as those with medical issues.

For example, in 1998, two students activated the fire alarm at a middle school and took up shooting positions around the outdoor field. The result was the Westside Middle School massacre with five people killed. In 1974, five people were killed and 11 injured when a student in New York fired on his classmates as they evacuated Olean High School.

I propose an evacuation decision-making process that begins with notification of a hazard and concludes with a rapid assessment to relocate to an alternative indoor location or return quickly indoors to the primary location. You’ll notice that evacuation is the HALFWAY point of the process, not the terminal activity. It is vitally important for emergency managers to understand that safety is not intrinsically linked with the outdoors.

Indeed, when folks have evacuated outdoors, there are many safety and security concerns present. For individuals with medical conditions, will they be able to take medication outdoors? What if they require privacy, drinking water, or a sharps container? Is there perimeter security for an outdoor evacuations (also known as “force protection”)? If the weather is severely cold, is ice accumulation a hazard? Is there the threat of frostbite? During severely hot weather, individuals outside for extended periods of time may become victims of heatstroke, dehydration, and other medical problems associated with exposure. When individuals are forced to evacuate and stand outdoors for extended periods of time, the potential for secondary medical emergencies and abandonment (the act of one or more individuals abandoning the evacuation effort) increases.

During an evacuation, discipline and accountability are crucial. Poor communication, inconsiderate attitudes towards those with special needs, and discomfort due to environmental conditions are all issues that plague evacuations and can lead to discord among the evacuated masses. As emergency managers, we must recognize that an outdoor evacuation should be planned to be as rapid as possible. If immediate return to the affected building is impossible, emergency managers must have a plan to immediately relocate personnel to an indoor evacuation rendezvous point. 

Hopefully, if we rebel against an “elementary” mindset of evacuation and plan for immediate relocation after evacuation, we’ll reduce the collective risk of injury or death due to outdoor safety/security concerns.

Active Shooter Training Isn’t Just for Cops and Teachers…

21 Saturday Jan 2012

Posted by in CAMPUS SAFETY, SECURITY, & PREPAREDNESS, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, PUBLIC HEALTH, RESPONSE

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The first active shooter exercise I witnessed (in 2002) ended with the shooter starting to open fire on his victims, the SWAT team appearing from nowhere then throwing a flash-bang device, and taking the suspect into custody. Before the controller yelled “ENDEX”, the last thing I heard was one of the police officers calling on his radio to send in the medics.

In Tucson, Arizona last year, deputies arriving to the scene of the Rep. Giffords shooting gained notoriety for using special medic kits to provide first aid to the injured. In Tucson, a SWAT medic had assembled $99 kits for police officers based on the military’s Improved First Aid Kit (I-FAK).

Many law enforcement agencies see their job as done once the scene is rendered safe. The Giffords shooting directed national attention to the valiant medical aid the deputies provided after handcuffing the shooter. More agencies are realizing the need for advanced medical training, equipment, and preparedness for all first responders. A recent article in Rialto, CA profiles a emergency room physician who joined Rialto’s SWAT team (they call him the “SWAT Doc”). In the article, Dr. Neeki is quoted saying “it is important for SWAT team paramedics to have advanced training in wound care, airway management techniques, and procedures for spinal injuries.” The doctor is right.

From my personal experience, few fire departments and emergency medical services folks are trained in active shooter response alongside law enforcement. Thus, in my opinion, the response is often disjointed (such as the scene I described where the police capture the bad guy and fail to assist in triage/first aid).

Arlington County, Virginia realized its fire fighters and EMS were not able to be as proactive in response to active shooter scenarios as they desired to be. An excellent, must-read article in the December 2009 issue of the Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS), describes what Arlington County found to be the problem. The article explains: “The current standard fire/EMS response to the active shooter is to stage in a secure location until police mitigate the threat and secure the area to create a scene safe for fire/EMS operations. But there’s a basic problem with this response: While waiting for a secure scene, those injured inside the building aren’t receiving care and are dying from their injuries.” To address this issue, Arlington assembled task forces of medics and police officers to improve safety for their responders while also improving the quality and speed of care for survivors of active shooter incidents. The task force developed protocols for responding to active shooters based on the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) school of thought. The TCCC concept was developed in 1996 and was first released in Military Medicine by CAPT Frank K Butler, Jr., MC USN, LTC John Hagmann, MC US, ENS E. George Butler, MC USN.

The major differences between traditional care and TCCC care during mass casualty incidents (with combat-like mechanisms of injury) cited in the JEMS article are the following:

  • Airway control is not the first priority. Not only are exsanguinating extremity wounds far more common than airway injury, but a person can bleed to death from a large arterial wound in two to three minutes, while it may take four to five minutes to die from a compromised airway.
  • Because supplies and resources are limited in combat and austere environments, medical treatment and stabilization must be done expediently with minimal supplies. Tourniquets are emphasized and prioritized as a quick and effective method to control extremity hemorrhage.
  • For non-exsanguinating hemorrhage, mechanical pressure dressings with wound packing are used. Some wounds, including those in the femoral triangle or in the neck, are not amenable to tourniquets. These wounds are controlled using hemostatic agents, such as Celox, QuikClot ACS and HemCon, in conjunction with direct pressure.
  • For airway control, nasopharyngeal airways are emphasized over oropharyngeal or endotracheal intubation; nasal airways are fast, stable and effective in all unconscious or altered mental status patients, regardless of the presence of a gag reflex. Intubation is de-emphasized because it requires extra equipment and loss of situational awareness.
In Arlington, the fire department established Rescue Task Forces (RTF) to incorporate TCCC principles into active shooter response. RTFs work in the following ways:
  • The first one or two RTF teams that enter the building move deep inside to stabilize as many victims as possible before any one victim is evacuated. As victims are reached, the RTF police officers provide security in place while the medics treat the victims. Using the concepts of TCCC, they stabilize only the immediately life-threatening wounds on each patient they encounter, but leave these patients where they are found and move on.
  • Medics are outfitted in ballistic vests and helmets to further mitigate the risk of operating in this environment. Based on daily staffing in Arlington County, a total of seven RTFs can be formed at any time, each equipped to carry enough supplies to treat up to 14 victims, depending on their injuries.
  • The number of victims that can be stabilized by these initial RTF teams is limited only by the amount of supplies carried in. Once out of supplies, teams start moving back out of the building, evacuating patients they’ve treated. At the same time, additional RTF teams are formed as personnel become available; these teams are brought in with the primary mission of evacuating the remaining stabilized victims.
  • A supply depot is set up near the entry point to the area of operations to allow for quick re-supply and turnaround for RTF teams. If needed, an internal casualty collection point will be set up near a secure entry point, where casualties can be grouped to allow for faster and more efficient evacuation by non-RTF EMS personnel.
  • All patients are eventually evacuated to an external casualty collection point well outside the building in a secure location where traditional EMS care is initiated.
While definitely sophisticated, I believe the system Arlington County developed is excellent at providing a confident response to an active shooting. Recently, in the District of Columbia, medics near a shooting actually hid rather than respond (DC ambulance hides after mass shooting). A confident and safe response is necessary in all jurisdictions. And please, next time you have an active shooter exercise, don’t stop the exercise when the cops take out the bad guy–real life consequences demand that we train to continue providing care to the injured after the threat has been terminated.

The Integrated Planning System (IPS): The Best Kept Secret in Planning

09 Monday Jan 2012

Posted by in CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

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Never heard of IPS?
In December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 was signed by the President, and, among other things, included a requirement for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop an integrated planning system (IPS) (released in January 2009)

IPS was designed to include six areas of importance: national planning doctrine, a system for identifying courses of action, a standard method for incorporating lessons learned, a process for linking tribal, local, state, and regional plans with Federal planning, a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of planning with all levels of government, and finally, a guide for for all-hazards planning. Incredibly, IPS accomplished its mission! 

NIMS references IPS, explaining that “while it is recognized that jurisdictions and organizations will develop multiple types of plans, such as response, mitigation, and recovery plans, it is essential that these plans be coordinated and complement one another. State, tribal, and local governments are encouraged to comply with the Integrated Planning System…” The only problem: IPS is so technical that few can stomach it. IPS never really caught on. Few people have implemented it.

How I learned to love IPS:
After Hurricane Ike in 2008, I was a contractor for FEMA using a draft version of IPS to perform strategic recovery planning at the JFO in Austin, TX. As a planning geek, I really like IPS. I liked it so much, that after our team wrapped up in Austin, I continued work at FEMA HQ in DC to develop a strategic recovery planning toolkit based on operationalizing IPS.

I discovered that IPS held a powerful framework and process for planning that provided insight to some the problems I’d experience with planning. As any planner will tell you, in large organizations, one plan seems to beget another plan, which begets yet another plan. Developing a hierarchy of plans is important for vertical integration–especially for large agencies or organizations with complex missions. But without IPS, there was no standardization in the Federal government emergency management plans.

But at less than 100 pages, IPS was a very brief adaptation of military planning doctrine, mainly the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the framework by which the US armed services plan operations together. For example, let’s say a mission in Adversariland was needed that required the Air Force to provide air cover, the Navy to soften beach defenses, Marines to create a beachhead, and soldiers to capture and hold a certain area. That “operation” is considered “joint” because it includes several different branches of the military. In my opinion, if JOPES is able to get marines, soliders, sailors, airmen, and coasties to all talk to one another and plan operations (even if it is only implemented at the highest ranks), it seems like it must have lessons that civilians could learn as well.

Vertical Integration:
In order to better understand IPS, I researched JOPES by reading publicly accessible JOPES training documents and manuals, such as the user guide for JOPES and the precursor to Joint Publication 5-0. JOPES can help civilian planners understand the various levels of planning (see above for the colorful table I made) and how plans that jumble all the levels together are poorly written and disjointed. A plan that drops from strategic level to tactical level is like an elevator without brakes. Vertical integration among complex, disparate organizations takes a strong foundation (found in IPS).

Whole Community = Comprehensive EM + Vertical Integration
For the FEMA “Whole Community” approach to work (which, at its core is decades of refining “comprehensive emergency management”), vertical integration is required. How can local plans integrate with regional plans, which integrate with state-level plans, which integrate with Federal plans and the 15 National Planning Scenarios? An integrated planning system accomplishes this audacious feat. Just when this whole system was about to work and progress the “whole community” ideology…

IPS…Gone, but not Forgotten…
At the end of March 2011, Presidential Policy Directive-8 (National Preparedness) was signed, rescinding HSPD-8 (the foundation of IPS). Although PPD-8 calls for the development of the National Preparedness Goal (released in Sept 2011) and the National Preparedness System (description released in Nov 2011), the foundational elements of IPS are lost. In its place are core capabilities, which are generic program elements, such as Planning, Public Warning and Coordination, and Operational Coordination. While I understand the change and I can appreciate the gained ease-of-use of some parts of the National Preparedness System (by the way, now we’re going to be getting National Planning Scenarios and the National Preparedness System confused…), I feel a tinge of loss for IPS. IPS is sound planning doctrine and provides an introduction to planning that the next generation of planners and emergency managers ought to have the benefit of learning.

Let’s hope the National Planning System can catch the attention of more planners and become the accepted standard that IPS wasn’t. If “whole community” is to be a reality, it will take a strong, integrated planning system.

The Need for Campus Emergency Planning Scenarios

28 Wednesday Dec 2011

Posted by in CAMPUS SAFETY, SECURITY, & PREPAREDNESS, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

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In March 2006, the Federal interagency community released its updated fifteen all-hazards planning scenarios entitled the “National Planning Scenarios” or NPS. NPS are planning tools that are representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the related impacts that face our nation. The objective of the NPS was to develop a minimum number of credible scenarios in order to establish the range of response requirements to facilitate preparedness planning at the Federal level.

NPS were used in the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, “National Preparedness,” including the development of the National Preparedness Goal and National Exercise Program (NEP). In helping to develop the National Preparedness Goal, NPS provided the foundation for identifying the capabilities across all mission areas and the target levels of those capabilities needed for effective prevention, response, and recovery to major events, such as those outlined in the NPS.

While documents like NPS, the National Preparedness Directive, and National Preparedness Goal constitute the foundation of planning and preparedness for Federal planners, very few foundational documents exist for our Nation’s most vulnerable citizens: our children.

With that in mind, I propose (in draft form) the following Campus Emergency Planning Scenarios (CEPS), sorted by natural hazards and man-made hazards:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the perfect world, each school would have an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) with hazard-specific annexes (taken from the aforementioned CEPS). Schools would design and develop plans that include protective measures, pre-scripted public information products, initial actions, coordination requirements, and tactical-level checklists for the incident commander and campus ICS positions.

While many schools may have plans for one or several of the CEPS hazards, few schools have comprehensive emergency management programs that address all of the CEPS hazards. By developing industry-accepted Campus Emergency Planning Scenarios, schools and school districts might be prompted to develop plans, policies, procedures, and protocols for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the hazards in CEPS. Based on CEPS, perhaps school administrators would be motivated to reach consensus on designing and developing a campus preparedness goal, campus preparedness system/framework, or even lobbying the Secretary of the US Department of Education to release a Campus Preparedness Directive.

As I mentioned earlier in this post, the scenarios I propose are in draft form and I would greatly appreciate any comments, feedback, or suggested changes.

FEMA’s Brand New Bag: The “Whole Community” Strategy

13 Tuesday Dec 2011

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As early as July 2010, Craig Fugate, the administrator of FEMA, has been talking about a “whole community” approach at FEMA. During testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in March 2011, Mr. Fugate explained that the “whole community” approach “recognizes that FEMA is not the nation’s emergency management team – FEMA is only a part of the team.  In order to successfully prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards, we must work with the entire emergency management community. This ‘Whole Community’ includes FEMA and our partners at the federal level; our state, local, tribal and territorial governmental partners; non-governmental organizations like faith-based and non-profit groups and private sector industry; and most importantly, individuals, families, and communities, who continue to be our greatest assets and the key to our success.”

Many people (especially FEMA employees and local municipalities) fondly remember “Project Impact: Building Disaster Resilient Communities” introduced by James Lee Witt in 1997. While not exactly the same, it seems that Fugate’s vision of a “whole community” is very much in line with the values and principles evinced by “Project Impact”. A couple of years ago I was in FEMA’s Region III office and I still saw hats and pins for Project Impact!

With the release of the National Disaster Recovery Framework and the promise of forthcoming frameworks for mitigation and preparedness, Mr. Fugate’s time at FEMA has been revolutionary. Under his watch, FEMA has experienced an incredible number of disaster declarations. From 2009 to this current moment, FEMA has been charged with response and recovery operations for 238 disaster declarations. For context, from 1980-1989, FEMA only had 237 disaster declarations! Mr. Fugate’s calm and effective leadership during extraordinary times is not just noteworthy, but is worthy of study for future generations.

Amid talk of a “new, new FEMA” and along with all the progress FEMA and the emergency management field in general has made since Hurricane Katrina, the timing is perfect for Mr. Fugate’s vision of a whole community strategy to motivate a new generation of public servants at all levels (whether they are in the Federal/state/local/tribal government or a community organization/volunteer active in disasters).

Responding to an Outdoor Active Shooter

11 Sunday Dec 2011

Posted by in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE

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Read about LAPD’s textbook response to an outdoor active shooter here

Since the Columbine massacre in 1999, many police and sheriff’s departments have trained for rapid responses to indoor active shooters. Fewer have explored the options and training for outdoor active shooters, although the differences between an indoor and outdoor active shooter are significant (and are also different from a sniper attack). I’m not an expert on law enforcement tactics, so I won’t be detailing best practices here. What I am concerned about is the need for additional training for law enforcement and guidance to the public regarding outdoor active shooters.

It’s not a surprise that LAPD responded so well to this most recent outdoor active shooter since the LAPD experienced one of the most notorious outdoor active shooter incidents in 1997 when two heavily-armed bank robbers began an outdoor gun battle with police (see North Hollywood shootout training video Part 1 & 2)

Disaster Mythology

03 Saturday Dec 2011

Posted by in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

≈ 1 Comment

Over the past few days, I’ve been asking my colleagues (on Twitter and in person) for common disaster myths they’ve encountered. I think I’ll start a series of disaster myth-busting blog posts in which I dissect some of the myths out there in regards to disasters, FEMA, and other organizations active in disasters.

Here is a short list of disaster myths (please feel free to comment to add more!).

  1. Disasters bring out the worst in society (also addressing “mass panic”)
  2. Disaster response and recovery is solely a governmental responsibility
  3. Damages from an improvised nuclear device (IND) are so catastrophic, there’s no use in preparing for it.
  4. Using the “Triangle of Life” concept during an earthquake is safer than the “duck, cover, and hold on” method.
  5. BlackBerry PIN-to-PIN messages are more resilient than other carriers’ SMS or text messages.
  6. Opening windows before a tornado strikes will equalize the pressure inside of the house and prevent more extensive damages or roof failure.
  7. Hiding underneath a highway overpass is a safe location during a tornado.
  8. FEMA will pay for any damages after any disaster
  9. Wireless Priority Service (WPS) / Government Emergency Telephone System (GETS) cards will override any non-prioritized callers.
  10. FEMA is a bloated, bureaucratic agency that is slow to respond and ends up taking over disaster operations from the local-level agencies.
  11. The government will be able to assist me immediately after a disaster.
  12. The US military can always be called in to provide disaster relief.

I’m extremely grateful for the contributions/suggestions by Shannon Buckland, Patrice Cloutier, Bryan Damis, Jim Garrow, Alisha Griswold, R. Kelzenberg, Steven Polunsky, and Rick Russotti.