Category Archives: HOMELAND SECURITY

5 Reasons Your Agency Should Have a Smartphone App

25 Thursday Jul 2013

Posted by in #SMEM, CAMPUS SAFETY, SECURITY, & PREPAREDNESS, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION, HOMELAND SECURITY

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July 2013 IAEM Bulletin graphic

“There’s an app for that” has become a very popular phrase–and not just from teenagers. Apps (short for applications) are programs designed to run on smartphones and/or tablets–even without a phone or data connection. In January, Apple announced that they have sold over 40 billion apps for their iOS devices (such as the iPhone and iPad). Clearly apps are a huge part of information-sharing and reaching our target population, here are some reasons why your agency should considered designing and developing your own app:

 1. Apps are popular

In June 2013, the Pew Research Center reported its findings that 56% of Americans have smartphones capable of downloading apps–up from just 35% in 2011. Additionally, the number of Americans without a cell phone is down to just 9% of the population. According to research from New Relic, the average smartphone has over three dozen apps (forty-one to be exact) and the average smartphone user checks her phone 150 times per day with 127 minutes per day spent on apps. It is estimated that by the end of 2013, there will be 1.82 billion active smartphones globally and within the next two years, almost 100 billion apps are predicted to have been downloaded by smartphone users.

2. Keep your constituents informed

Unlike a webpage, when content or information is updated in an app, the app can send an alert to the smartphone user to acknowledge the update (also called “push” alerts). During an emergency, it is possible to also send direct messages to users through the app. While not robust enough for a sole means of emergency notification, push alerts or push notifications can be one of the tools emergency managers use for notifying the public. Additionally, if your agency includes plans in its app, app users will always have the most up-to-date plans. When posted on the internet, users can sometimes stumble upon an older version of a plan that has been saved by a search engine or re-posted by local groups, etc. With an app, there is unfiltered access to the most up-to-date information (without the fear of cached versions of older plans recirculating during an emergency).

3. Productivity without connectivity

When disconnected from wifi or wireless data feeds, apps can still function because they have the ability to save information to a user’s smartphone from the previous time an update was downloaded or a connection was available. If your agency wishes to provide any type of guidance for constituents if wireless connectivity is degraded, apps are a good solution. For items like evacuation routes, shelter guides, checklists, and other steady-state documentation, the apps can include those documents and simply update any of the documentation when the user connects to the internet–yet still maintains a copy on the user’s smartphone for when internet connectivity is unavailable.

4. Longer Reach

Since almost all smartphone users keep their phones nearby (how else would they be able to check their phones 150 times per day?), the smartphone is a better targeted device for distributing information than a laptop or desktop computer. Apps are built for ease of use–especially in transit or on the go. For emergency managers, our intended audience during an emergency are those constituents who can be empowered with the right information to help themselves and their community. Oftentimes, information is needed immediately–not when a person can find a computer nearby. Thus, the app is a perfect way of presenting actionable, executable information in a timely manner in a reliable format.

 5. Deeper Integration

As the operating systems (OS) of mobile devices become more advanced, apps are becoming better integrated with other programs on smartphones, such as maps, the address book, GPS, text messaging, and social media. The benefit of emergency management apps would be the deeper integration with other platforms. In a large-scale disaster, an emergency management app could open up a smartphone’s maps app to plot a course to safety. Once safe, an emergency management app could recommend using social media (rather than a phone call–which ties up limited bandwidth) to let family members and friends know that the user is safe. Deeper integration with reminders, calendar appointments, and other future mobile platform developments can serve to promote preparedness, enhance dynamic, safe responses, and encourage more robust recovery from disaster.

Screenshot 2012.09.07 12.06.45

While not every emergency management agency is ready to release their own app, agencies such as Washington, DC’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), Virginia’s Department of Emergency Management (VDEM), and even FEMA have already released apps for specific use during emergencies. Will your agency be next?

EM Defined: Preparedness vs. Readiness

19 Sunday Feb 2012

Posted by in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS

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Trying to define preparedness or readiness can be a frustrating task. It turns out that while there are many definitions, most skirt the task of actually providing a useful definition. For example, Webster’s dictionary defines preparedness as “the quality or state of being prepared” (prepared is defined as “subjected to a special process or treatment”). Poor definition leads to poor comprehension, which impedes our collective ability to improve preparedness.

In fact, when PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health Research Institute (HRI) polled industry leaders in 2007 to define preparedness, “they agreed on only two things: (1) there is currently no universally accepted definition of preparedness; and (2) we must continue getting ‘better prepared.’” 

The DHS Lexicon (2007) defined preparedness as “activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve readiness capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from natural or man-made incidents.” Note that this definition mentions readiness. There’s a lot of confusion regarding preparedness and readiness. In fact, the now defunct Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8, explains that “The term ‘preparedness’ refers to the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The term ‘readiness’ is used interchangeably with preparedness.”

While the DHS Lexicon equates readiness with preparedness, I have a different perspective. In my opinion, preparedness is the sum of plans, policy, procedures, protocols, risk/hazard/threat/vulnerability identification/analysis, and development of training curriculum for incident response/recovery. In my opinion, readiness is somewhat different. Readiness is the capability of successfully responding or conducting recovery operations (in other words, the ability to implement processes, procedures, etc included in preparedness).

For example, police officers don’t have much preparedness on a normal patrol (a police car equipped with a shotgun and some flares) but police officers maintain a high degree of readiness (in the sense that they are able to respond quickly, understand how to order additional resources, and are generally well-trained). Developing the training is preparedness but ensuring that everyone is trained and able to execute their function is readiness.

While the differences between the two concepts might seem slight, both concepts are crucially important to ensuring a proper balance between theory and practice in maintaining successful and progressive emergency management programs.


Active Shooter Training Isn’t Just for Cops and Teachers…

21 Saturday Jan 2012

Posted by in CAMPUS SAFETY, SECURITY, & PREPAREDNESS, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, PUBLIC HEALTH, RESPONSE

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The first active shooter exercise I witnessed (in 2002) ended with the shooter starting to open fire on his victims, the SWAT team appearing from nowhere then throwing a flash-bang device, and taking the suspect into custody. Before the controller yelled “ENDEX”, the last thing I heard was one of the police officers calling on his radio to send in the medics.

In Tucson, Arizona last year, deputies arriving to the scene of the Rep. Giffords shooting gained notoriety for using special medic kits to provide first aid to the injured. In Tucson, a SWAT medic had assembled $99 kits for police officers based on the military’s Improved First Aid Kit (I-FAK).

Many law enforcement agencies see their job as done once the scene is rendered safe. The Giffords shooting directed national attention to the valiant medical aid the deputies provided after handcuffing the shooter. More agencies are realizing the need for advanced medical training, equipment, and preparedness for all first responders. A recent article in Rialto, CA profiles a emergency room physician who joined Rialto’s SWAT team (they call him the “SWAT Doc”). In the article, Dr. Neeki is quoted saying “it is important for SWAT team paramedics to have advanced training in wound care, airway management techniques, and procedures for spinal injuries.” The doctor is right.

From my personal experience, few fire departments and emergency medical services folks are trained in active shooter response alongside law enforcement. Thus, in my opinion, the response is often disjointed (such as the scene I described where the police capture the bad guy and fail to assist in triage/first aid).

Arlington County, Virginia realized its fire fighters and EMS were not able to be as proactive in response to active shooter scenarios as they desired to be. An excellent, must-read article in the December 2009 issue of the Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS), describes what Arlington County found to be the problem. The article explains: “The current standard fire/EMS response to the active shooter is to stage in a secure location until police mitigate the threat and secure the area to create a scene safe for fire/EMS operations. But there’s a basic problem with this response: While waiting for a secure scene, those injured inside the building aren’t receiving care and are dying from their injuries.” To address this issue, Arlington assembled task forces of medics and police officers to improve safety for their responders while also improving the quality and speed of care for survivors of active shooter incidents. The task force developed protocols for responding to active shooters based on the Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) school of thought. The TCCC concept was developed in 1996 and was first released in Military Medicine by CAPT Frank K Butler, Jr., MC USN, LTC John Hagmann, MC US, ENS E. George Butler, MC USN.

The major differences between traditional care and TCCC care during mass casualty incidents (with combat-like mechanisms of injury) cited in the JEMS article are the following:

  • Airway control is not the first priority. Not only are exsanguinating extremity wounds far more common than airway injury, but a person can bleed to death from a large arterial wound in two to three minutes, while it may take four to five minutes to die from a compromised airway.
  • Because supplies and resources are limited in combat and austere environments, medical treatment and stabilization must be done expediently with minimal supplies. Tourniquets are emphasized and prioritized as a quick and effective method to control extremity hemorrhage.
  • For non-exsanguinating hemorrhage, mechanical pressure dressings with wound packing are used. Some wounds, including those in the femoral triangle or in the neck, are not amenable to tourniquets. These wounds are controlled using hemostatic agents, such as Celox, QuikClot ACS and HemCon, in conjunction with direct pressure.
  • For airway control, nasopharyngeal airways are emphasized over oropharyngeal or endotracheal intubation; nasal airways are fast, stable and effective in all unconscious or altered mental status patients, regardless of the presence of a gag reflex. Intubation is de-emphasized because it requires extra equipment and loss of situational awareness.
In Arlington, the fire department established Rescue Task Forces (RTF) to incorporate TCCC principles into active shooter response. RTFs work in the following ways:
  • The first one or two RTF teams that enter the building move deep inside to stabilize as many victims as possible before any one victim is evacuated. As victims are reached, the RTF police officers provide security in place while the medics treat the victims. Using the concepts of TCCC, they stabilize only the immediately life-threatening wounds on each patient they encounter, but leave these patients where they are found and move on.
  • Medics are outfitted in ballistic vests and helmets to further mitigate the risk of operating in this environment. Based on daily staffing in Arlington County, a total of seven RTFs can be formed at any time, each equipped to carry enough supplies to treat up to 14 victims, depending on their injuries.
  • The number of victims that can be stabilized by these initial RTF teams is limited only by the amount of supplies carried in. Once out of supplies, teams start moving back out of the building, evacuating patients they’ve treated. At the same time, additional RTF teams are formed as personnel become available; these teams are brought in with the primary mission of evacuating the remaining stabilized victims.
  • A supply depot is set up near the entry point to the area of operations to allow for quick re-supply and turnaround for RTF teams. If needed, an internal casualty collection point will be set up near a secure entry point, where casualties can be grouped to allow for faster and more efficient evacuation by non-RTF EMS personnel.
  • All patients are eventually evacuated to an external casualty collection point well outside the building in a secure location where traditional EMS care is initiated.
While definitely sophisticated, I believe the system Arlington County developed is excellent at providing a confident response to an active shooting. Recently, in the District of Columbia, medics near a shooting actually hid rather than respond (DC ambulance hides after mass shooting). A confident and safe response is necessary in all jurisdictions. And please, next time you have an active shooter exercise, don’t stop the exercise when the cops take out the bad guy–real life consequences demand that we train to continue providing care to the injured after the threat has been terminated.

The Integrated Planning System (IPS): The Best Kept Secret in Planning

09 Monday Jan 2012

Posted by in CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

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Never heard of IPS?
In December 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 was signed by the President, and, among other things, included a requirement for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop an integrated planning system (IPS) (released in January 2009)

IPS was designed to include six areas of importance: national planning doctrine, a system for identifying courses of action, a standard method for incorporating lessons learned, a process for linking tribal, local, state, and regional plans with Federal planning, a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of planning with all levels of government, and finally, a guide for for all-hazards planning. Incredibly, IPS accomplished its mission! 

NIMS references IPS, explaining that “while it is recognized that jurisdictions and organizations will develop multiple types of plans, such as response, mitigation, and recovery plans, it is essential that these plans be coordinated and complement one another. State, tribal, and local governments are encouraged to comply with the Integrated Planning System…” The only problem: IPS is so technical that few can stomach it. IPS never really caught on. Few people have implemented it.

How I learned to love IPS:
After Hurricane Ike in 2008, I was a contractor for FEMA using a draft version of IPS to perform strategic recovery planning at the JFO in Austin, TX. As a planning geek, I really like IPS. I liked it so much, that after our team wrapped up in Austin, I continued work at FEMA HQ in DC to develop a strategic recovery planning toolkit based on operationalizing IPS.

I discovered that IPS held a powerful framework and process for planning that provided insight to some the problems I’d experience with planning. As any planner will tell you, in large organizations, one plan seems to beget another plan, which begets yet another plan. Developing a hierarchy of plans is important for vertical integration–especially for large agencies or organizations with complex missions. But without IPS, there was no standardization in the Federal government emergency management plans.

But at less than 100 pages, IPS was a very brief adaptation of military planning doctrine, mainly the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the framework by which the US armed services plan operations together. For example, let’s say a mission in Adversariland was needed that required the Air Force to provide air cover, the Navy to soften beach defenses, Marines to create a beachhead, and soldiers to capture and hold a certain area. That “operation” is considered “joint” because it includes several different branches of the military. In my opinion, if JOPES is able to get marines, soliders, sailors, airmen, and coasties to all talk to one another and plan operations (even if it is only implemented at the highest ranks), it seems like it must have lessons that civilians could learn as well.

Vertical Integration:
In order to better understand IPS, I researched JOPES by reading publicly accessible JOPES training documents and manuals, such as the user guide for JOPES and the precursor to Joint Publication 5-0. JOPES can help civilian planners understand the various levels of planning (see above for the colorful table I made) and how plans that jumble all the levels together are poorly written and disjointed. A plan that drops from strategic level to tactical level is like an elevator without brakes. Vertical integration among complex, disparate organizations takes a strong foundation (found in IPS).

Whole Community = Comprehensive EM + Vertical Integration
For the FEMA “Whole Community” approach to work (which, at its core is decades of refining “comprehensive emergency management”), vertical integration is required. How can local plans integrate with regional plans, which integrate with state-level plans, which integrate with Federal plans and the 15 National Planning Scenarios? An integrated planning system accomplishes this audacious feat. Just when this whole system was about to work and progress the “whole community” ideology…

IPS…Gone, but not Forgotten…
At the end of March 2011, Presidential Policy Directive-8 (National Preparedness) was signed, rescinding HSPD-8 (the foundation of IPS). Although PPD-8 calls for the development of the National Preparedness Goal (released in Sept 2011) and the National Preparedness System (description released in Nov 2011), the foundational elements of IPS are lost. In its place are core capabilities, which are generic program elements, such as Planning, Public Warning and Coordination, and Operational Coordination. While I understand the change and I can appreciate the gained ease-of-use of some parts of the National Preparedness System (by the way, now we’re going to be getting National Planning Scenarios and the National Preparedness System confused…), I feel a tinge of loss for IPS. IPS is sound planning doctrine and provides an introduction to planning that the next generation of planners and emergency managers ought to have the benefit of learning.

Let’s hope the National Planning System can catch the attention of more planners and become the accepted standard that IPS wasn’t. If “whole community” is to be a reality, it will take a strong, integrated planning system.

Disaster Mythology

03 Saturday Dec 2011

Posted by in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HOMELAND SECURITY, PREPAREDNESS, RECOVERY, RESPONSE

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Over the past few days, I’ve been asking my colleagues (on Twitter and in person) for common disaster myths they’ve encountered. I think I’ll start a series of disaster myth-busting blog posts in which I dissect some of the myths out there in regards to disasters, FEMA, and other organizations active in disasters.

Here is a short list of disaster myths (please feel free to comment to add more!).

  1. Disasters bring out the worst in society (also addressing “mass panic”)
  2. Disaster response and recovery is solely a governmental responsibility
  3. Damages from an improvised nuclear device (IND) are so catastrophic, there’s no use in preparing for it.
  4. Using the “Triangle of Life” concept during an earthquake is safer than the “duck, cover, and hold on” method.
  5. BlackBerry PIN-to-PIN messages are more resilient than other carriers’ SMS or text messages.
  6. Opening windows before a tornado strikes will equalize the pressure inside of the house and prevent more extensive damages or roof failure.
  7. Hiding underneath a highway overpass is a safe location during a tornado.
  8. FEMA will pay for any damages after any disaster
  9. Wireless Priority Service (WPS) / Government Emergency Telephone System (GETS) cards will override any non-prioritized callers.
  10. FEMA is a bloated, bureaucratic agency that is slow to respond and ends up taking over disaster operations from the local-level agencies.
  11. The government will be able to assist me immediately after a disaster.
  12. The US military can always be called in to provide disaster relief.

I’m extremely grateful for the contributions/suggestions by Shannon Buckland, Patrice Cloutier, Bryan Damis, Jim Garrow, Alisha Griswold, R. Kelzenberg, Steven Polunsky, and Rick Russotti.